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Abstract: 
 
New Zealand has long been regarded as a country with little or no governmental corruption. In recent 
times it has been ranked consistently as one of the five least corrupt countries in the world, on Transparency 
International’s (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). In 2009 and 2011 it was ranked as the single most 
corruption-free country on the CPI, and in 2012 it shared first place with Denmark and Finland.  This paper 
examines the reasons why historically New Zealand has been largely free of governmental corruption, using 
widely accepted definitions of what constitutes corrupt behaviour. It goes on to argue that, at least by its own 
normal standards, the country might now be more susceptible to corruption, for a variety of reasons, in both the 
public and private sectors, and that more political and administrative attention may need to be paid to this issue. 
The paper discusses New Zealand’s surprising tardiness in ratifying the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption, an apparent reluctance that leaves the country sitting alongside other non-ratifying countries which 
have endemic levels of corruption in all its forms. In this context, the paper also notes some international 
dissatisfaction with New Zealand’s anti-money laundering legislation, enacted in 2009. 
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Introduction  
 
New Zealand has a long-standing reputation as a country in which there is little or no 
governmental corruption. A seldom asked question is: why is this so? In fact, the reasons as to why 
any country has high or low levels of corruption are seldom self-evident, and usually beg closer 
examination. There are several main factors, discussed below, which provide an answer to this 
question in New Zealand’s case. However, circumstances change, and there is no guarantee that 
either corruption generally or governmental corruption specifically will not become significant 
problems in New Zealand. There are some signs, which are examined here, which suggest that while 
relative to other countries New Zealand continues to enjoy very low levels of corruption, nevertheless 
there is no room for national complacency on this issue, certainly not if concern is gauged against the 
country’s own high standards.  The country’s strong international reputation in this regard, which in 
itself is an important national asset, could be subjected to significantly closer scrutiny in the years 
ahead.        
New Zealand and the Corruptions Perceptions Index (CPI) 
 
New Zealand has long been rated by Transparency International’s Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) as one of the six least corrupt countries in the world.  It was rated as first, or first equal 
(that is, perceived as the least corrupt or equally least corrupt country in the world), in 2006, 2007, 
2008, 2009 and 2010, sitting alone atop the rankings in 2009 and 2011, and sharing the top position 
again (with Denmark and Finland) in 2012.  New Zealand’s image as a country in which there is 
very little, if any, governmental corruption is all the more impressive because of the country’s bi-
cultural and multi-cultural character, as charges and counter-charges of corruption are thought to be 
far more common in multi-cultural settings. The CPI model largely avoids rapid shifts in rankings, 
and may even carry with it a propensity to serve as a self-fulfilling factor. And one of the founding 
members of TI has argued that the CPI, following the advent in 2003 of the United Nations 
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Convention against Corruption, should no longer be published in its present form because it tends 
to undermine the efforts of reformers (Galtung, 2006).  Nevertheless, Iceland, which ranked first 
equal in 2006 (with Finland and New Zealand) but later experienced a national banking collapse, 
had dropped to 13th by 2011 (but rising to 11th in 2012), thus demonstrating that prevailing 
perceptions of a country’s national integrity and honesty can indeed change quite rapidly (Zirker, 
Gregory and Scrimgeour, 2012).  
 
Why has New Zealand historically been largely corruption-free? 
 
 Among the most difficult research questions which arise out of the CPI are those which seek 
to explain why some countries differ in their levels of governmental and societal corruption. At one 
level, such answers are not far to seek, on the face of it at least, if researchers want to know why, 
for example, Denmark or New Zealand experience much lower levels of corruption than, say, 
Vietnam or the Philippines, or Mongolia, or Somalia. Conventional responses in such cases would 
probably refer to data such as that provided by the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 
which place strong emphasis on factors like the rule of law, regulatory quality, voice and 
accountability, not to mention the control of corruption itself. At the risk of being somewhat 
tautological, the latter WGI dimension – control of corruption – suggests that corruption is low 
because it is well controlled. Such a focus on the control of corruption is of crucial importance, and 
much of the comparative literature on corruption argues the importance of institutionalised 
principal-agent relations, notably a well-resourced, independent and impartial anti-corruption 
agency driven by high levels of political will, the rule of law, a similarly independent and impartial 
judiciary, and so on, in the successful containment of corruption (Quah, 2003, 2010, 2011).  
However, these principal-agent interpretations, as important as they are, often do not tell the full 
story. In focusing largely on political dimensions they tend to overlook the more dynamic historical, 
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cultural and social factors which often are at least as, if not more, important in understanding why 
some countries have lower levels of corruption than others. In fact, each country has its own 
particular narrative. A good example of such a narrative is the following, offered as a partial 
explanation of the rise in corruption in Spain around the mid-2000s:  
…in the years following Franco’s death (1975) up to the early 1990s, the focus of the builders 
of the new local and regional politico-administrative structures—that is to say, mainly the 
Socialists—was on weakening the administrative controls on local governments inherited from 
the dictatorship…The building of a public administration for the new democracy was largely 
neglected. This shortcoming was accompanied by an outsized interpretation by the 
Constitutional Court and others of the newly acquired municipal autonomy bestowed uniformly 
on all municipalities by the 1978 constitution…These two elements (large autonomy and weak 
control) led to a very weak checks and balances system…and to the assumption that at the local 
and regional government levels, a politician winning an election had carte blanche, an 
unrestricted power to do as he saw fit (Cardona, 2013: 95). 
 
For the purposes of comparison, it is not difficult to provide, for example, a plausible 
explanation as to why Somalia has much more corruption than Denmark, an explanation that will 
owe much more to historical and cultural factors than to principal-agent differences. Conversely, 
historical and cultural factors are likely to be less important than principal-agent approaches in 
explaining why two countries, Denmark and New Zealand, are consistently ranked on the CPI as 
being largely corruption-free.  In comparisons like this, cultural and historical factors seem less 
important than the fact that both countries are highly rated on the WGI.     
In such cases comparative investigation into cultural and historical elements seems irrelevant. 
But is it? What about, for example, Australia and New Zealand, two countries with similar cultures 
and heritages (the ‘ANZAC’ tradition), and both Westminster-styled parliamentary democracies, 
but which have continued to display consistently different rankings on the CPI, with New Zealand 
always significantly higher than Australia?1  In the 13 years from 2000 to 2012, New Zealand’s 
lowest position on the CPI was third or third equal, while from 2006 to 2012 it was either first or 
first equal. On the other hand, Australia’s lowest ranking was 13th, in 2000, and its highest was 
seventh equal, in 2012. New Zealand’s average CPI score during this period was 9.42, while 
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Australia’s was 8.65 – a substantial difference in perceived levels of corruption within these two 
countries with such similar backgrounds. How can this difference be explained? 
Some obvious factors immediately suggest themselves as plausible explanations: for example, 
early European Australia was to a large extent a penal colony, whereas New Zealand was a British 
settler society; and Australian political culture never embraced egalitarian ideals, as did New 
Zealand’s – whereas Australia, perhaps because of resentment of the English, developed its self-
image along individualist and competitive American lines. By contrast, New Zealanders generally 
looked fondly on Britain as ‘home’, and were one of the first countries to develop a welfare state.  
Moreover, as a federal system, Australia experienced political corruption reminiscent of American 
‘Tammany Hall’ politics, especially in New South Wales and Victoria in the earlier half of the 20th 
century (see Griffin, 1990, 2004). While this form of politics was not completely absent in New 
Zealand, it was much less common. However, while it might seem plausible—on the face of it—to 
suggest that Australia’s 19th century history as a British penal colony gave rise to non-compliance 
norms and values (presumably because a higher propensity for unlawful behaviour has been passed 
down through Australian generations), it would be drawing a very long bow to conclude that this 
helps to explain why there have been higher overall levels of corruption, or at least the perceptions 
thereof, in Australia than in New Zealand.  Ironically, the central figure in New Zealand’s early 
colonisation—the director of the New Zealand Company, Edward Gibbon Wakefield—had in 1827 
himself been sentenced to three years in London’s Newgate prison on abduction charges (Temple, 
2002).  
We will sketch some reasons as to why New Zealand, in its own terms, has enjoyed for so 
long a reputation for having very low levels of corruption, especially in government. There are two 
interrelated issues: New Zealand’s reputation as being a country with very low levels of corruption, 
on the one hand, and the reality of corruption in New Zealand, on the other. Clearly, most of the 
available evidence suggests that the reputation quite closely matches the reality: there are unlikely 
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to be expanding black seams of governmental venality occluded behind the country’s ‘clean and 
green’ and corruption-free image. Accepting that proposition then, we find that any explanation of 
why this is the case must take the form of some story, a narrative that blends historical, social, 
political and cultural dimensions into a reasonably coherent and plausible explanation. The 
alternative—a rigorous scientific collation and interpretation of hard data, producing a conclusive 
result—is almost certainly beyond practical reach. 
We suggest that perhaps the most important factor has been New Zealand’s strong egalitarian 
ethos that underwrote one of the world’s first welfare states (King, 2003; Lipson, 1948; Sutch, 
1969).2  Most early New Zealand settlers came in the mid-19th century from a Britain in which they 
themselves were oppressed by class divisions. Although privilege did emerge, largely in the form of 
‘squatters’ who acquired large land-holdings, the emergent political culture was resistant to such 
acquisition, and by the turn of the 20th century it had broken down. As Fischer (2012) has 
demonstrated in his comprehensive historical comparison between New Zealand and the United 
States, New Zealanders have traditionally been far more committed to fairness rather than freedom, 
while in America the converse has generally been true. In fact, by 1930 the news media in America 
tended to characterise New Zealand’s carefully regulated emphasis on fairness in society as an 
outrageous denial of freedom, even the hallmark of an emerging fascist state.  In an article by a 
‘special correspondent’, entitled ‘Life in New Zealand Now Ruled by Decree; Even Chicken-
Raising Is Regulated by State’, the New York Times reported that: 
The nooks and corners that [New Zealand] has explored in its Fascist rule may be seen from the 
fact that it has forbidden the building of any more movie theatres without permission, on the 
ground that there are already more than enough, has refused to issue any more leases to coal 
operators to mine on State lands because of over-production of coal, and has even determined to 
register and control all persons who own ten hens or more and sell eggs….Slowly this 
democracy is turning into a Fascist State.  When it completes the cycle it will do so with a 
thoroughness which will fill the Black Shirts with envy (New York Times, December 11, 1930: 
E4). 
 
As two commentators later said about the New Zealand government’s economic stabilization 
programme, during the Second World War, ‘…the government was engaged in an elaborate piece 
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of social engineering. Ministers were attempting to construct a wartime economy that would treat 
all sections as fairly as possible’ (Bassett and King, 2000: 201). Another has called the country’s 
egalitarian ethos ‘a society of fair shares’ (Roberts, 1978: 73).   
Nevertheless, any relationship between egalitarianism—especially as ‘fairness’—and 
corruption itself awaits adequate explanation (Gregory, 2003).  Relatively low levels of government 
corruption are also seen in jurisdictions like Singapore and Hong Kong, which are by no means 
egalitarian, and in New Zealand itself, where income inequality has increased almost dramatically 
since the economic reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the country still ranks at the top of 
the CPI.3  On the other hand, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, all at or near the top of the CPI, are 
countries with historically strong egalitarian cultures, and all today have Gini co-efficient scores 
much lower than New Zealand’s, as has Australia.  All these countries (and Hong Kong) score well 
on the Worldwide Governance Indicators, however, confirming that lower levels of corruption are a 
function of factors other than just egalitarianism. In his commentary on an analysis of a recent 
increase in corruption in Spain, Cardona (2013: 95) said that, ‘I could not agree more with the 
concluding remarks of the article: “institutional designs and procedures that promote accountability 
and transparency in government, to the extent that they prevent corruption, may help diminish 
disaffection and promote compliance with laws and social norms.” For the sake of completeness, I 
would only add that if policies also promote equality, the propensity to seek corrupt deals 
dwindles.’  Again though, the question is–why? It might be because egalitarianism per se, that is, 
income equality, does not keep corruption at minimal levels, but that egalitarianism itself reflects a 
social ethos which places a relatively low emphasis on acquisitive and competitive values, 
especially those which define social status overwhelmingly as a function of wealth.     
Another important and allied factor in New Zealand was the strong Calvinist culture that the 
country’s British settlers brought with them, especially from Scotland, and which endured at least 
until the middle of the 20th century. Values of thrift, hard work, and social cohesion were central to 
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the country’s development as ‘God’s Own Country’ (or ‘Godzone’, as it is more cynically referred 
to today), a relatively prosperous, modern mixed economy, a welfare state built on land-based 
primary industry. Throughout most of the 20th century, until the loss of primary markets, and the oil 
shocks in the 1970s, New Zealand’s economic policies were deeply interwoven with its egalitarian 
social structure. These policies embodied the key objectives of full employment, financial stability, 
favourable terms of trade, and high productivity. 
Further, New Zealand is a small country – today with a population of 4.45 million. As an 
island nation in the south Pacific, it has also been largely ‘quarantined’ from international 
influences that might otherwise have threatened to strain its social fabric. At least until Māori 
migration from rural to urban areas from the 1950s onwards, the rapid rise in Pacific Island 
immigration from about the same time, and the rapid increase in Asian immigrants from the 1980s, 
the country was dominated by European New Zealanders, fostering at least the illusion of a 
homogenous culture and society.   
Especially during the decades when New Zealand was even less populous than it is today, 
urban and provincial communities enjoyed high levels of social capital, reciprocal bonds of 
collective cooperation and high levels of interpersonal trust. Thorstein Veblen’s ‘conspicuous 
consumption’ was in these times scarcely apparent in New Zealand, not because high levels of 
individual and family wealth did not exist, but because strong social norms and expectations 
ensured that it was seldom flaunted. Social ‘respectability’ was highly valued and most people were 
wary about engaging in any form of behaviour which, if exposed to public scrutiny, would result in 
a loss of individual or family reputation. In many ways, therefore, the social and political climate in 
New Zealand was for a long time highly conformist, indeed in many ways stifling; but at the same 
time it was not an environment encouraging of those with corrupt intent. In short, New Zealand was 
largely a country of innocence, straight-laced, rather naïve and unsophisticated, and with virtually 
no organised crime built around prostitution, gambling, or boot-legging. Even low-level tipping was 
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not socially acceptable. The New Zealand Police (formerly called the New Zealand Police Force) 
was itself almost entirely devoid of the sort of corruption commonly associated with police 
behaviour in other countries, including New Zealand’s trans-Tasman neighbour, Australia (Holmes, 
2010). 
Unlike Australia, New Zealand has had a unitary system of government since its fledgling 
provincial governments were abolished in 1876. Like Australia, however, its head of state is the 
British monarch, and both countries inherited the Westminster model of Parliamentary democracy, 
though each has developed its own parochial version of that system (Weller, Wanna and Patapan, 
2005). New Zealand was a full-fledged member of the ‘Old Commonwealth’ – along with Britain, 
Canada, South Africa, and Australia, countries not known for having significant levels of 
governmental corruption.  New Zealand did not acquire formal constitutional independence from 
Britain until 1947, but in the preceding decades had achieved a great deal of de facto independence.   
In this era of nation-building, the passage through Parliament of the Public Service Act of 
1912 (coming into force the following year) was a seminal and foundational event. The Act, 
consistent with developments in other parts of the English-speaking world, established a unified, 
professional, merit-based public service career system, one that was centrally controlled, and that 
endured until the radical state sector reforms of the 1980s and 90s. The Act put a stop to the 
rampant political patronage that had hitherto characterised public service employment in the 
preceding decades. It laid the foundation for the emergence of a strong public service ethos, which 
became instilled in employees from the time of their initial recruitment after leaving school or 
university until their retirement from this essentially closed-shop career 30 or 40 years later. During 
this time, most employees saw themselves generically and collectively as ‘public servants’, 
regardless of the positions they as individuals held, or the roles that they performed.  According to 
Webb (1940: 84), ‘Every cadet who enters the service does so in the knowledge that there are no 
barriers to his [sic] advancement to the highest positions, that his capacities will be impartially 
9 
 
 
 
assessed, that his right of appeal against decisions affecting his status and salary is carefully 
safeguarded, and that he will be adequately pensioned on his retirement.’ Fairness was again a key 
value. Similarly, as Lipson (1948: 479) argued in his a seminal commentary on New Zealand’s 
egalitarianism, ‘there is a commendable absence of graft and a strict code of honesty’, attributable 
in his view to job security, strict accounting and audit requirements, and also to an ‘inner check’ 
reflecting public servants’ professional commitment to the ideal of the public interest’.   
This ‘normative model’ was in turn strongly reinforced by rigorous controls exercised over 
government officials, controls which allowed zero tolerance of any form of behaviour that could be 
defined as corrupt or even unethical. As a leading New Zealand public service practitioner-scholar 
wrote in the late-1950s:  
There seems to be common in New Zealand a notion that the responsibilities and 
moral obligations of public servants are somehow substantially greater than those of 
other citizens…If his standard of conduct is more scrupulous—and, in some respects it 
is—the reason is to be found largely in the self-interest of the public servant. He is 
subject to more extensive controls than most private citizens: he is more likely to be 
caught if he commits an indiscretion: his career may suffer even if there is only 
suspicion of unsatisfactory conduct (Polaschek, 1958: 283).   
 
New Zealand was the first country to introduce the Danish institution of the Ombudsman, in 1962, 
as a further means of control over executive authority, and it opened up official information to the 
public in the early 1980s, well before the abolition of the Official Secrets Act in Britain.  Albeit 
heavily controlled, a career in the service of government gave employees secure employment as 
long as they remained totally non-corrupt, and even if they were only adequately competent.   
Nor was the financial grass necessarily greener in the private sector. Security of tenure was 
not really bought at the cost of substantially lower wages than those available in the private sector. 
The ‘public service discount’ was not only generally minimal, but under the ‘mildly corporate’ 
system of wage-fixing that characterised New Zealand’s industrial relations for several decades, 
state sector pay rates were often seen to be ahead of those available in private employment (Roberts, 
1978).4     
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However, as Lipson (1948: 481-82) argued, the state in New Zealand was not some external 
force in the continental European tradition. It was rather the people themselves in action, nation-
building in pragmatic rather than ideological ways, and only too ready and willing to develop 
national infrastructure in the absence of commercial competition. In this, public employment was 
not seen as having one’s ‘snout in the public trough’, and although New Zealand never developed 
an institutionalised administrative elite like that in Britain, its public service ethos similarly 
embodied values like honour, duty, decency and a strong sense of the public interest.  There was 
little if any scope or even temptation for corruption in procurement, of the kinds that are 
commonplace elsewhere. The Department of Public Works, established in 1876, later the Ministry 
of Works, monopolised such development, and was itself firmly imbued with the high standards of 
ethical probity than characterised the wider state sector.  
This strong normative ethos was greatly reinforced during the years of World War II by the 
serendipitous convergence into top leadership positions in the New Zealand public service of a 
group of several highly capable men, all able practitioners of ‘the profession of statecraft’ (Martin, 
1988). One leading public administration scholar has suggested that the period 1940 to 1951 was 
‘the age of mandarins’ in New Zealand government (Martin, 2010). If Ralph Waldo Emerson (1841) 
believed that ‘an institution is the lengthened shadow of one man’, then as a institutional whole the 
New Zealand public service could be seen to embody key values shared by this group of men. They 
were fully committed to the tacit ‘Schafferian Bargain’ which shaped the relationship between the 
political executive and the top levels of the public service (Hood and Lodge, 2006), though the idea 
of ‘serial loyalty’ (to successive governments of a different political stripe) on the part of the 
mandarins was not really tested, as the first Labour Government held office for 14 years, from 1935 
to 1949.5  Characterising one of these men, as if describing them all, Duff (1941: 95) observed that, 
‘He is a public servant. With his energy, ability and bold imagination, he could have had a half a 
dozen careers and made half a dozen reputations. But he entered the public service. He remained in 
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the public service. He is the public service …’ The commitment to impartiality and the rule of law 
in the administration of public policy was very powerful in New Zealand (and remains so). This 
cohort of outstanding top officials clearly understood that the opposite of impartiality in public 
office was the use of that office for illegitimate private gain, and through their own behaviour they 
set standards that became deeply embedded in the culture of New Zealand public service (Gregory, 
1999).  
Nor was it irrelevant that these public service ‘mandarins’ lived and worked in the capital city 
of Wellington, located in the centre of the country, at the foot of the North Island. They would, of 
course, have made their collective impression in the centre of government, wherever it had been 
located, but the fact that Wellington had been chosen as the capital city in 1865 by New Zealand’s 
then Governor, Sir George Grey, was a significant factor in the emergence of a largely non-corrupt 
governmental system. Prior to that choice, from 1841 to 1865, the capital city had been Auckland, 
in the north of the North Island. Auckland had always been, as it is today, by far New Zealand’s 
largest city, but it was in those days not only the centre of government, but also a city imbued with 
the spirit of commercial entrepreneurship and associated ‘wheeling and dealing’, with money the 
predominant standard by which success was measured. (This remains largely the case today.)  By 
choosing Wellington as the new capital city, albeit largely for logistical reasons, Governor Grey 
was also laying the foundation for a capital city whose culture would be shaped by governmental 
rather than commercial values and institutions, and thus would be less likely—especially in these 
earlier decades of cultural emergence—to become tainted with corruption.  
The year 1865 was squarely in the middle of the New Zealand Wars, previously known as the 
‘Land Wars,’ or the ‘Māori Wars,’ which were fought from 1845 to 1872 between the forces of the 
colonial government (the Crown) and many Māori iwi (tribes) (Belich, 1998; King, 2003). They 
involved the punitive confiscation of large areas of Maori land by the government, in apparent 
contravention of the country’s founding constitutional charter, the Treaty of Waitangi, signed in 
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1840 between the Crown and many Māori iwi. More than one hundred and thirty years later, about 
the mid-1970s, at the beginning of what many have seen as a Māori cultural and political 
renaissance, the New Zealand government began a process of Treaty Settlements, to provide 
redress for historical grievances, a process which continues to this day.  
This whole issue is raised here because it shows how any consideration of corruption in the 
history of New Zealand government needs also to be viewed from the perspectives of Māori, who 
were victims of unjust practices perpetrated by the Crown and its agents mainly in the 19th century, 
notwithstanding the fact that the early colonial administration in New Zealand had been at pains to 
deal fairly and honestly with land acquisition and settlement issues. Indeed, it would not be 
drawing too long a bow to see much of this behaviour by the Crown’s agents as a form of ‘greed’, 
corruption, even though public officials themselves may not have been the prime beneficiaries.6  If 
corruption as a governmental phenomenon has to be gauged largely by perceptions of its incidence, 
then it clearly matters as to who is doing the perceiving. Just as ‘seeing is believing’, so too is the 
converse the case: ‘believing is [not] seeing.’ In this connection, it is worth quoting from two of the 
most acute historical observers of New Zealand society, to help understand why perhaps New 
Zealanders’ national self-image, born of cultural insecurity, has tended to be self-congratulatory 
rather than self-critical. The French political commentator, André Siegfried, in 1914 published his 
observations of New Zealand society, wryly noting that, ‘Many New Zealanders are honestly 
convinced that the attention of the whole world is concentrated on them, waiting with curiosity and 
even with anxiety to see what they will say and do next…they have become so accustomed to being 
taken seriously that they have become conscious of a mission to humanity’ (Siegfried, 1914: 58-59). 
Writing nearly half a century later, Lipson (1948: 459-60), noted that this attitude was still 
prevalent. ‘The publicity of the government, the press, and a host of private organisations 
constantly assures the public that New Zealand leads the world in this, that, and the other’, he noted. 
‘So often is the point repeated and asserted about so many features of the Dominion’s life that it is 
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now earnestly believed by the majority. It is held as a faith which few call in question…Under its 
worst forms it can degenerate into smugness and complacency, the national delusion of the self-
satisfied.’ 
 
A changing picture of corruption in New Zealand 
 
In New Zealand, legal definitions of what constitutes corruption are narrow and orthodox. 
‘Bribery and Corruption’ as such is covered by two statutes—the Crimes Act 1961, and the Secret 
Commissions Act 1910. The Crimes Act (Part VI - ‘Crimes affecting the administration of law and 
justice – Bribery and Corruption’) provides for prison sentences of up to 14 years for judicial 
officers and ministers of the Crown, who seek or accept bribes, and of up to seven years for anyone 
who offers a bribe to them; and sentences of up to seven years for any Member of Parliament, law 
enforcement officer or bureaucrat who accepts or seeks a bribe, and up to seven years for anyone 
offering bribes to them or to foreign officials (unless the bribe, offered outside of New Zealand, is 
not illegal in that other country). An official can receive a sentence of up to seven years in prison 
for using official information for personal advantage; and anyone who uses or discloses for his or 
her own advantage personal information illegally supplied by an official is liable for up to seven 
years in prison.  The Secret Commissions Act, which is perhaps mistakenly seen to cover ‘private 
sector’ corruption, deals with the secret acceptance of ‘valuable considerations’ (commissions) by 
agents unknown to their principals, including such commissions received in the procuring of 
contracts.  The conduct of New Zealanders transacting business overseas is now subject to the 
provisions of Britain’s forceful Bribery Act, which became operational in 2011, and which reflects 
the international anti-corruption strategies being pursued by organisations such as the World Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Asia Development Bank (ADB), the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and so on. New Zealand businesses that have 
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close dealings with enterprises in countries where corruption is endemic may be more at risk of 
falling foul of the provisions of this particular piece of legislation.  
   The penalties under the Secret Commissions Act are currently light, and are now under 
legislative reconsideration, with the aim of bringing them into line with the bribery and corruption 
penalties applying under the Crimes Act.  Also, Parliament is currently considering extending the 
corruption provisions in the Crimes Act to cover ‘trading in influence’ – whereby a public official, 
in exchange for advantages, undertakes to use his influence to benefit the person who provides the 
advantages. These initiatives follow governmental consideration of law changes that would be 
required in New Zealand were Parliament to ratify the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption (more on this below).  
Even before the world financial crisis of 2008, financial fraud had become glaringly apparent 
in New Zealand. A former head of New Zealand’s Serious Fraud Office (SFO) publicly admonished 
corporate directors for doing too little about ‘financial crime and corruption’ in their organisations, 
in the light of a series of high profile convictions of finance company executives following a spate 
of institutional collapses linked to the international financial crisis of the late 2000s, and involving 
the loss to investors of hundreds of millions of dollars. He argued that New Zealand is today 
socially, ethnically and financially—‘in terms of rich and poor in our society’—a ‘very different 
country than we were a few years ago and, particularly since the global financial crisis’ (Birchfield, 
2012).  The former director dismissed the value of the CPI’s rating of New Zealand: in his view, 
company directors and legislators were sweeping the country’s growing crime and corruption 
problem under the board table.’ In support of his arguments, he cited the results of an SFO survey, 
which indicated that a majority of New Zealanders did not share the CPI’s view of corruption in 
their country: only 37% of respondents believed that the country was ‘largely free’ of serious fraud 
and corruption.  At the height of the share market boom before the October 1987 crash, illegal and 
dodgy commercial practices were rife. According to Bruce Jesson (1999: 126), ‘Not only did the 
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ethical standards of business collapse during the share market boom, but so also did the notion that 
there should even be ethical standards...’   
A Price Waterhouse Cooper/Office of the Auditor-General (2011) survey of fraud and 
corruption in New Zealand organisations of various sizes found that such events in the previous two 
years, with a cost of more than $100,000, were reported by up to eight percent of respondents. 
Fraud and/or corruption events in the previous two years, with a cost of between $10,000 and 
$100,000, were reported by up to 9.5 percent of those surveyed.  A KPMG survey in 2012 of fraud, 
bribery and corruption in Australia and New Zealand, while not providing separate data on each 
country, found that ‘almost three-quarters of respondents reported that their organisation has 
experienced behaviours that are defined as bribery or corruption’ (KPMG, 2013: 34). Moreover, 
while perpetrators of fraud were more likely to be non-management employees, a ‘real concern’ 
was that fraud committed by senior executives and company directors had doubled since 2006 
(KPMG, 2013: 9).  The study also found that more than half of the respondents indicated that their 
organisations did not perform active monitoring of bribery and corruption payments.   There is no 
central clearing house for information about the prosecution and conviction of New Zealand public 
officials on corruption or fraud charges, but some casual research only between 2001 and 2005 
uncovered a not insubstantial list (Gregory, Zirker and Scrimgeour, 2012: 14-15; Gregory, 2002, 
2006.  See Appendix. It can also be noted in this connection that New Zealand has no common law 
offence of ‘Misconduct in Public Office’, such as exists in Hong Kong.)   
More needs to be known about how New Zealanders perceive activities that could be called 
corrupt. Taito Philip Field, a Samoan New Zealander who became the first New Zealand MP to be 
convicted and imprisoned for corruption, claimed at his trial in 2009 that New Zealanders did not 
understand the time-honoured Pacific tradition of gift-giving.  The Supreme Court, which 
unanimously rejected his appeal, said that any gift-giving to officials with the power to influence a 
relevant case represented corruption.7  The then head of New Zealand’s immigration service, Mary 
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Anne Thompson, was seen to have practised nepotism in 2008, in attempting to gain residency to 
New Zealand for some of her Pacific Island extended family members. She also pleaded guilty to 
having falsely claimed to have received a doctorate from the London School of Economics and 
Political Science (Gregory, 2009). Donna Awatere Huata, an MP at the time of committing her 
offences, was sentenced in 2005 to 33 months in jail for stealing from a Māori trust set up to help 
under-privileged children, and for perverting the course of justice. In 2011, a former Accident 
Compensation Corporation (ACC) National Property Manager was convicted on charges of 
corruption while in office and sentenced to eleven months of home detention.  In recent years, there 
have been several cases of MPs ‘double-dipping’ on accommodation allowances, and exorbitant uses 
of travel allowances. After public scrutiny the Deputy Prime Minister, Bill English, repaid $12,000 
worth of housing allowances. These public controversies are New Zealand’s milder version of the 
much larger frauds perpetrated on British taxpayers in recent years by several Westminster MPs. 
While not comparable in scope or size to the most egregious cases that were uncovered in Britain, 
they do not help to sustain public trust in New Zealand’s politicians. Commenting on practices that 
were commonplace in the late 1990s, criminologist Greg Newbold (2000: 42) observed that,  ‘The 
squandering of millions of dollars by politicians and public servants through expensive trips abroad, 
golden handshakes and opulent conferences is now well known.’ 
In 2000 the then State Services Commissioner argued that there were two countervailing 
pressures against New Zealand’s record of honesty in the public sector. The first related to 
documents of national identity and residents’ permits, and their importance to an increasing level of 
Asian-based international organised crime activity in the Pacific region. In his words: 
…since the end of the Cold War there has been an increase in both political instability and 
international criminal activity in our region. International organised crime based in Asia is 
having an impact in the Pacific, including in New Zealand. Documents of national identity and 
residents’ permits have a particular value in this milieu. The criminals have large sums at their 
disposal.  The sums of money that can be offered to officials are very large compared with 
officials’ annual salaries (State Services Commission 2000: 3-4). 
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The second risk factor, according to the Commissioner, was the fact that personal information had 
become ‘a marketable and valuable commodity’.  
 
Corruption issues and reputational risks in New Zealand 
 
The relationship between corruption and national reputation in countries with a free press is 
typically mediated by the national news media.  New Zealand’s impressive successes in combatting 
corruption, retaining its CPI status as the perceived least corrupt country in the world, and as the 
best place to do business, 8 as well as a veritable parade of other impressive rankings and awards, 
are ceremonially and repeatedly recorded in the country’s news media.  Nevertheless, dire warnings 
of the ‘slippery slope’ of corruption, and the need for ‘more transparency’, also figure prominently, 
occasionally in the same reports.9  It is clear that New Zealanders have a lot to lose, although 
repeated sterling non-corruption rankings lead to complacency, and represent a potential 
disincentive to anti-corruption policy-making, and vigilance in defence against corruption.  Even as 
national corruption scandals, ‘loopholes’ in New Zealand’s legislation, the apparent growth of 
organised crime, and, perhaps—most threatening of all—the rapid growth of income inequality in 
New Zealand, make their way into headlines, New Zealand’s international reputation seems to 
prosper.  How long will this last? 
Corruption scandals have increased exponentially in the last five years, at least in their 
coverage in New Zealand’s media.  The most prominent recent example of these followed the New 
Zealand Police arrest (in concert with the American FBI) of Kim Dotcom, a multi-millionaire 
German internet site operator with a shady past, residing in New Zealand and accused of massive 
copyright violations through his ‘Mega Upload’ site, which at one point accounted for nearly five 
percent of the world’s internet traffic.  Dotcom (his name changed legally to reflect his occupation) 
seems to have had special support in his successful bid for New Zealand residency.10  Soon after his 
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arrest he announced that a member of the ruling National Party coalition, John Banks—the only 
Association of Consumers and Taxpayers (ACT) MP in the House of Representatives, had accepted 
an ‘illegally anonymous’ $50,000 campaign donation from him during his (Banks’) unsuccessful 
2010 Auckland mayoral campaign.11  The rules are clear on this: if a candidate knows the source of 
a major campaign donation, it must be listed by source, not as ‘anonymous,’as Dotcom’s had been.  
A number of candidates, including Bank’s former rival in the 2011 Parliamentary election (as head 
of the new Conservative Party), Colin Craig, have expressed outrage at this ‘corrupt behaviour,’ and 
are moving to replace Banks at the first opportunity.12  In any event, both Banks’ and New 
Zealand’s reputations were threatened by this, with the New Zealand Police investigating alleged 
campaign violations 13  before deciding, on apparently shaky grounds, not to press charges.14  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to list all of the recent corruption scandals that pose 
reputational risks to New Zealand.  Suffice it to say that there has been a series of scandals of 
various kinds involving prison guards, police officers, and former and current officials (including a 
former Minister of Justice) involved with allegedly fraudulent investment schemes, and so on, some 
of which are listed in the Appendix.  While it can be argued that the public prosecution of such 
cases is in keeping with New Zealand’s corruption-free reputation, the recently reported growth of 
organised crime in New Zealand, sometimes linked to the Chinese Triads and other groups involved 
in illegal drug manufacturing and distribution, has the potential to sully this reputation.  In this 
context, the apparent reluctance of New Zealand to ratify (after signing in 2003) the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption (UNCaC), which would compel major public officials and their 
families to maintain full financial transparency, and the belated passage of the Anti-Money 
Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism Act (Public Act 2009 No. 35, which only went 
fully into effect in 2013), suggest a degree of inertia in New Zealand’s defence of its clean, green 
image.15 Regarding the latter, anti-money laundering legislation has been at the forefront of world-
wide anti-corruption efforts over the past several decades, but New Zealand’s belated adoption of 
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this legislation required extraordinary training of local firms,16 most of which have been engaged in 
high levels of foreign trade, apparently without formal/legal observation of international legal 
norms in combatting corruption.17  There is little doubt that the Anti-Money Laundering Act, as it is 
gradually implemented, will have a major remediating impact in this previously grey area of New 
Zealand’s global financial linkages. 
Revelations in 2012 that a loophole in New Zealand’s trust laws allows off-shore parties with 
no legal connection to New Zealand to establish tax-free trust havens suggest a further challenge to 
the country’s non-corrupt reputation. 18   As an intermediary for Cayman Islands-style banking 
secrecy, it is increasingly presumed that New Zealand is indirectly benefitting through its trust 
system from global financial malfeasance, at least some of which is certain to be corruption.   
A recent Bill before the House to control the worst excesses of Parliamentary ‘lobbying’ 
underscores yet another risk to New Zealand’s non-corrupt reputation. 19   Largely uncontrolled 
lobbying in Parliament has increasingly been reported in the news media as a growing problem that 
is often linked to corruption.  Efforts to regulate lobbying have encountered significant resistance, 20 
raising further doubts about the authenticity of New Zealand’s reputation.21 Open access to the 
nation’s MPs has long been seen as a hallmark of New Zealand’s vibrant democracy. Lobbyists 
have quickly come to represent a direct threat to the country’s non-corrupt reputation, and thus to its 
democratic tradition. 
Arguably, the most corrosive change in New Zealand society is the marked growth in income 
inequality that has beset the country since the neo-liberalisation of the state, beginning in 1988, and 
its impact upon a putative growth in corrupt tendencies.  As news reports noted in 2011 and 2012, 
the gap between the rich and the poor has increased more than in any other OECD country over the 
past two decades, on top of a widening gap in all other OECD countries.22  A recent Salvation Army 
report stresses this, arguing that increasing numbers of New Zealanders had been marginalised in 
the last two years.23 This manifests itself immediately in the well-being (or lack thereof) of children, 
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24 and in deteriorating race relations.25  With the wealthiest one per cent of the population now 
owning three times more than ‘the combined cash and assets of the poorest 50 per cent’, 26 the 
presumption is that increasing crime, including corruption, and even a surge in some diseases, 
might result. 27 
Probably the most aggressive current assault on New Zealand’s non-corrupt reputation is 
materialising in the city of Christchurch’s rebuilding project, following the destructive earthquakes 
of 4 September 2010, and 22 February 2011.  Despite explicit warnings in the national media of the 
potential for fraud and corruption in the multi-billion dollar rebuilding project,28 contractors using 
public funds have made significant use of illegal migrants, paying miniscule wages, and in violation 
of visa restrictions. 29 Another alleged fraud, worth ‘billions of dollars’, was reported in the national 
media to be under investigation by the Serious Fraud Office in late 2012.30  
 
Conclusion 
 
In providing a set of largely narrative reasons as to why New Zealand has for a very long time 
been a country without significant levels of governmental and other corruption, and while 
suggesting that the country’s top ranking on the CPI does not tell the full, or even the most 
interesting story, we do not mean to imply that all of a sudden corruption is becoming a major 
problem in New Zealand. Rather, we argue that there are significant recent signs that it is becoming 
an issue of increasing, if still little recognised, public importance, and that the country’s strong 
international reputation may warrant closer scrutiny. While recent evidence may go nowhere near 
indicating that corruption in New Zealand may grow to a scale comparable to that in many other 
countries, nevertheless, if New Zealanders are genuinely concerned to maintain the standards they 
have been accustomed to in the past, then more public policy attention may soon need to be given to 
this complex and difficult issue.     
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Appendix 
1.  An Immigration Department officer pleaded guilty to accepting $100,000 in bribes to secure 
permanent residency for Korean immigrants and was jailed for two-and-a-half years.  
2. A Housing New Zealand employee was jailed for accepting bribes amounting to $60,000.  
3. A Department of Conservation senior manager was jailed for defrauding his department of $180,000.  
4. A case manager with the former Department of Work and Income (DWI) was imprisoned for selling 
confidential beneficiary information to a repossession agent and for stealing more than $30,000 from 
the department.  
5. A senior property manager for the same department was jailed for three years after receiving nearly 
$640,000 in bribes. 
6. Another official of this department pleaded guilty to 32 charges of misappropriation totalling more 
than $30,000.  
7. In March 2002 yet another employee of DWI, who had worked for the department for 16 years, was 
jailed for defrauding the agency of more than $81,000.  
8. A Customs Service official was jailed after pleading guilty to bribery and fraud charges involving the 
importation of luxury stolen cars. 
9. An official with the Ministry of Economic Development was jailed for 18 months for using official 
information to set up his own business.  
10. A clerk in the same ministry was convicted of stealing more than $25, 000 from her employer. 
11.  A Fire Service national commander resigned after an internal investigation found he had spent ‘a 
significant amount’ of public money on family travel and private international phone calls. 
12.  A Customs Service officer sentenced to nine years in jail for his involvement in drug smuggling by 
organised crime. 
13.  An Inland Revenue Department (IRD) officer pleaded guilty to six charges of failing to maintain the 
secrecy of taxpayers’ and the department’s information. 
14. Another IRD officer was jailed for selling taxpayers’ details to debt collectors. 
15.  A ministerial secretary was convicted for her part in passing on confidential Inland Revenue 
Department information to a family member chasing a debt. 
16.  Forty-three staff of the Ministry of Social Development were caught committing fraud totalling 
$729,442 during 2000 – 2003.   
17.  An Immigration Service official was sacked after requesting sexual favours from a woman applicant. 
18.  An Immigration Service worker charged with stealing from foreigners in the course of his work faces 
seven years’ jail if found guilty (case pending).   
19.  In a very high profile case, a manager in the Ministry of Social Development was jailed for five and a-
half years for defrauding the agency of $1.9 million over a period of 28 months, and for receiving a 
benefit while working full-time in the organisation. 
 
Earlier in the 1990s, the Executive Director of New Zealand’s Sports Foundation was imprisoned for 
stealing over $1 million from the organisation; a former railways consultant was sent to jail for defrauding 
New Zealand Railways of $46,000; a commercial manager of the Electricity Corporation of New Zealand, 
was jailed for defrauding the organisation of $1.1million; and a former Controller and Auditor-General 
himself was jailed for defrauding the public purse of about $56,000 while in office. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
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Notes  
 
                                                 
1  The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) was an expeditionary force that fought in the First World 
War’s Battle of Gallipoli in 1915. 
2  New Zealand’s welfare state developed more along the lines of the British ‘model’ rather than the more strongly 
social-democratic Scandinavian one. See Esping-Andersen (1990). 
    3  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_income_equality 
4  In this system, which endured until the radical reforms of the 1980s and 90s, the government held the ring in 
negotiations among the three dominant pressure groups – the Federation of Labour, the Employers’ Federation, and 
Federated Farmers. 
5  Essentially, the terms of this tacit bargain are that the political executive will forego involvement in the recruitment 
and promotion of public servants, who in turn will forego some political rights in return for security of employment and 
dutiful loyalty to the government of the day. 
6  See Bauhr and Nasiritousi (2011).  ‘Greed’ corruption refers to actions of political and bureaucratic grandees who 
greedily capture state assets by virtue of their high positions in government. ‘Need’ corruption is engaged in by middle 
and lower-level officials who pettily seek to enhance their income by exploiting the discretionary authority they are able 
to exercise over citizens with whom they directly transact. 
7  An MP for 15 years, Field was sentenced to six years in jail. 
8 See: Ben Chapman Smith and Hamish Fletcher (2012) ‘NZ Ranked Best in World to Do Business’, New Zealand 
Herald, 16/11/2012: http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=10847700 , accessed 
08/02/2013. 
9 ‘Editorial: The time has come for more transparency’, The New Zealand Herald, 11/04/2012. 
10 The Dotcom scandal is sometimes portrayed in the media as representing a major threat to New Zealand’s non-
corrupt reputation. ‘Editorial: Kim Dotcom sets off year of fireworks for politicians’, New Zealand Herald, 27/12/2012. 
11 It was listed as anonymous, and Banks has said that he was unaware of its source despite Dotcom’s frequent 
testimony to the contrary. 
12 Fairfax NZ News, ‘Colin Craig and John Banks Compared’, 08/05/2012:  
www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/6877074/Colin-Craig-And-John-Banks-Compared, accessed 08/02/2013.  
13 John Hartevelt (2012) ‘Widening Banks Campaign Donations Probe’, Fairfax NZ News, 30/04/2012: 
www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/6826949/Widening-Banks-campaign-donations-probe , accessed 08/02/2013.  
14 Police found that Banks did solicit the donations but didn’t have enough evidence under current legislation to charge 
him, specifically, that ‘they could not establish Banks had the necessary knowledge that a $15,000 donation from 
SkyCity was recorded as anonymous before he signed and submitted his return. They made the same finding about 
anonymous radio advertisements worth $15,690 and two $25,000 donations from internet million Kim Dotcom.’ 
Fairfax News NZ 2012, ‘Banks won't be charged, police say’, Fairfax News NZ, 26/07/2012: 
http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/7353754/Banks-won-t-be-charged-police-say .  
15 http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2009/latest/DLM2140720.html , accessed 08/02/2013.  
16 For example, barristers Wilson and Harle in Auckland launched a website in 2010 to begin training corporate 
executives in the nuances of the new bill.  As the website notes, ‘A long-awaited upgrade of New Zealand's Anti-Money 
Laundering (AML) law was finally passed by Parliament late last year.  But although this is one of the most far-
reaching pieces of law reform to hit the financial sector in recent years, it remains an over-arching framework only - it 
is not yet properly in force, and a lot of specific detail is still to be developed for particular sectors via subsidiary 
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regulations and guidelines.  Now the “rubber” is starting to hit the road, with the Ministry of Justice starting to develop 
those details in a consultation paper covering the specific AML regime likely to apply to regulated “reporting entities”.  
The Ministry and the other supervising agencies are keen "to test some initial thinking with industry" on the matters that 
will find their way into the detailed aspects of the regime: the regulations, codes of practice and guidelines that will 
flesh out the bare bones of the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism Act 2009 (AML/CFT 
Act). This article recaps the essentials of New Zealand's new AML framework, and then examines some key aspects of 
the Ministry's detailed proposals, which are available at www.justice.govt.nz . Submissions can be made by 19 March 
2010’.  http://www.wilsonharle.com/new-zealand-s-anti-money-laundering-law-now-the-rubber-hits-the-road/ , 
accessed 10/02/2013. 
17 It is difficult to avoid the central importance of this fight against the most extreme forms of corruption. The British 
Bank, HSCB, for example, agreed in December of 2012 to pay nearly $2 billion to US authorities after admitting to 
laundering at least $881 million in drug trafficking money in a case that received close attention in the New Zealand 
media.  The New Zealand Herald described it as ‘the latest scandal to hit banks since the financial crisis started in 2008.  
Standard Chartered PLC, another British bank, signed an agreement with New York regulators on Monday to settle a 
money-laundering investigation involving Iran with a $340 million payment.’ APN 2012, ‘HSCB to pay $1.9b to settle 
money-laundering case’, New Zealand Herald, 12/12/2012. 
18 A recent New Zealand TV-3 exposé underscored the use of New Zealand trust laws to establish anonymous tax-free 
trusts for off-shore interests: http://www.tv3.co.nz/October-7th---Treasure-
Islands/tabid/2059/articleID/79738/Default.aspx  Accessed 08/02/2013. 
19 Adam Dudding (2011) ‘Inside political lobbying’,  Fairfax  NZ News, 17/07/2011: 
www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/5297632/Inside-political-lobbying , accessed 08/02/2013.   
20 John Hartevelt (2012) ‘Lobbyists push back against bill’,  Fairfax NZ News, 25/10/2012: 
www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/7859944/Lobbyists-push-back-against-bill , accessed 08/02/2013; in an editorial in 
the Dominion Post, a constitutional lawyer stridently criticised the bill, arguing that the bill is badly drafted and would 
distance MPs from ‘the people’: Jordan Williams 2012, ‘Lobbying bill will distance people from MPs’,  Dominion Post, 
21/09/2012: www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/7708988/Lobbying-bill-will-distance-people-from-MPs , accessed 
08/02/2013. 
21 Dudding (above) quotes the late Jeremy Pope in his article. Pope, a New Zealander and one of the founders of 
Transparency International, argued that the lack of transparency in New Zealand, and particularly in such activities as 
lobbying, was ‘an accident waiting to happen.  No one knows how many there are and who they’re lobbying for and 
who they’re lobbying to’. www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/5297632/Inside-political-lobbying, accessed 08/02/2013.   
22 Kirsty Johnston (2011) ‘New Zealand’s Wealth Gap Widens’, Dominion Post, 06/12/2011: 
www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/news/6092339/New-Zealands-wealth-gap-widens , accessed 08/02/2013; Gordon 
Campbell (2011) ‘Putting the Focus on Income Inequality’,  The Wellingtonian, 11/08/2011: 
www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/news/local-papers/the-wellingtonian/opinion/5423125/Putting-the-focus-on-income-
inequality , accessed 08/02/2013.  Campbell observes that the 10 wealthiest New Zealanders own approximately 11 per 
cent of the country’s GDP, while the 10 wealthiest Australians own just over 4 per cent of the Australian GDP; 
Michelle Cooke (2012) ‘Poor Get Poorer, inequality reigns—survey’,  Fairfax NZ News, 23/08/2012:  
www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/7536914/Poor-get-poorer-inequality-reigns-survey , accessed 08/02/2013.  Cooke 
notes that New Zealand household incomes declined by three percent between July 2010 and June 2011, that the 
incomes of the lowest decile declined markedly, while the incomes of the top deciles increased, and that 21 per cent of 
New Zealand children now live in poverty, again a marked change over the past decade.  
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